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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a "No Cause" Judgment entered in a personal injury case. 
The judgment was entered after a trial by jury. The judge who made the order 
was the Honorable Judge William W. Barrett. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this 
court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure Rule 3 because the Order of a "No Cause" judgment entered 
on May 10, 2006, is considered a final decision of the District Court. The appeal 
was filed in this matter on June 8th, 2006. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISION, STATEMENT OF 
THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant plaintiffs Motion of 
Plaintiff to be Relieved of the Court's Suppression Order and to allow Plaintiff to 
Supplement his Interrogatory Responses and other Discovery Responses. Said 
motion was made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Court of Appeals should review this matter under an "abuse of discretion' 
standard. Blacks Title Inc. v. Utah State Insurance Department, 1999 UT 330 
(Utah 1999). 
This issue was preserved by a motion filed by appellant. The motion is set 
forth in pages 271-276 on the appellate record. 
The rule that is of central importance to the appeal is Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b) states as follows: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 29, 2001, the defendant in this matter, Thomas Sprague, operated his 
motor vehicle in a negligent fashion so as to collide with the vehicle driven by the 
plaintiff in this matter, Andy Rukavina. Plaintiff was extremely injured by the 
catastrophic damage caused by the accident. A settlement demand was made on 
the defendant's insurance company which included various medical documents. 
The parties could not settle the matter so a complaint was filed and litigation 
commenced. 
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Disclosure rules contained in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 26, 
were largely ignored by plaintiffs counsel. No disclosures were made. 
Interrogatories were propounded by defense counsel and interrogatories were 
largely answered. No motion to compel further discovery responses was made. 
No motion to compel any discovery responses was made. Defense counsel had an 
opportunity to depose plaintiff and deposed plaintiff. Defense counsel was aware 
of plaintiff s treating physicians and chose not to depose them. 
A pre-trial conference was held setting the trial date. In the hallway of the 
courthouse outside of the courtroom where the pre-trial conference was held, 
plaintiffs counsel disclosed to defense counsel that he intended on calling 
plaintiffs treating physicians to testify concerning the cause of the injuries 
sustained and the prognosis of plaintiff. Defense counsel did not indicate to 
plaintiffs counsel that he was going to object to those witnesses. Plaintiffs 
counsel also indicated that he intended on calling before and after witnesses to 
testify at the trial, once again, defense counsel did not indicate that he was going 
to object the calling of such witnesses. 
A trial date was set, but plaintiffs counsel did not designate witnesses 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(a)(4)(C). Defense counsel 
filed a Motion in Limine which was heard on or about December 2, 2006. The 
court granted defense counsel's Motion in Limine indicating that plaintiff could 
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call three treating doctors as witnesses but that the witnesses could not testify 
concerning causation or anything else not contained in the medical records. The 
court also excluded one very important "before and after" witness which plaintiff 
intended to call. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to be Relieved of the effects of the court's ruling, 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), but the motion was denied. A 
trial was held and a "No Cause" Judgment was rendered. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this matter on August 27, 2003. (See Record 
on Appeal at pp. 1-6.) 
2. The Complaint alleges the negligence of the defendant wherein the 
defendant negligently knifed his car into plaintiffs vehicle causing plaintiff 
damages. (See Id.) 
3. Interrogatories and document production demands were propounded on 
plaintiff by defendant. (See Record on Appeal at pp. 294-311.) 
4. The following occurred during the course of the proceedings: 
a. Plaintiff did not file Initial Disclosures; (See Record on Appeal at p. 
294-311.) 
b. Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but did not supplement them; (See 
Record on Appeal, pp. 294-311.) 
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c. In plaintiffs answers to interrogatories, he identified only one trial 
witness, Dr. Robert Rothfeder; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
d. Plaintiff did not file a designation of expert witnesses, nor did he 
provide any expert reports; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
e. Plaintiff did not produce any documents during the course of discovery; 
rather, he produced limited documents prior to litigation to defendant's insurance 
carrier; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
f. The only documents that were produced in this case were produced by 
defendant and his attorney; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
g. Plaintiff did not produce any documents to support a lost wage claim, 
despite the fact that they were asked for in a request for production of documents 
and in his deposition; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
h. Plaintiff wholly failed to respond to defendant's request for production 
of documents; (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
i. Plaintiff did not oppose, in writing, Defendant's Motion in Limine; 
(See Record on Appeal, pp. 187-198.) 
j . Despite not filing a written opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine, 
the Court heard oral argument on the motion on December 2, 2005; (See Record 
on Appeal, p. 202.) 
k. Plaintiffs counsel was present and presented his objections to the 
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motion in limine; (See Record on Appeal, p. 202.) 
1. On that same date, plaintiffs counsel produced his designation of trial 
witnesses which included four "before and after" witnesses (one of whom was 
prominent criminal defense attorney and cousin of plaintiff, Mr. Ron Yengich), 
Dr. Dennis Wyman, Dr. Paul Winterton, and Eugene Hawkins, D.C. (See Record 
on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
m. Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel at least three months prior 
to trial that he intended on calling on most, if not all, of plaintiff s treating 
physicians to testify in the matter. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
n. Plaintiffs counsel informed defense counsel that he intended on calling 
three or four "before or after" witnesses. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 294-295.) 
o. At no time did defense counsel inform plaintiffs counsel that defense 
counsel intended on moving to exclude the testimony based on the fact that they 
had, not prior to that time, been disclosed. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 269-270.) 
5. Plaintiff filed a motion to be relieved of the court's suppression order. (See 
Record on Appeal, pp. 269-270.) 
6. The court denied the plaintiffs motion to be relieved of the court's 
suppression order. (See Record on Appeal, p. 314.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court in this matter committed reversible error because it did not grant 
appellant's motion to be relieved from the court's suppression order. Appellant's 
motion was made pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). Under 
Rule 60(b)(1), appellant moved to set aside the suppression order on the basis of 
"surprise." 
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure describes four bases where 
the party or his legal representative can be relieved from a proceeding. They 
include: (1) mistake; (2) inadvertence; (3) surprise; and, (4) excusable neglect. 
Most of Utah's case law regarding Rule 60(b)(1) revolves around the "excusable 
neglect" prong of the rule. The motion in the lower court in this case was made 
under the "surprise" prong of the rule. No Utah case interprets or describes the 
necessary conditions for the "surprise" element. 
Appellant is claiming that his attorney was surprised by the court's ruling 
which limited the testimony of the treating physicians and which excluded a 
before and after witness. The testimony was limited so that the treating physicians 
could not testify concerning the cause of plaintiff s injuries or his prognosis. 
Plaintiffs attorney was surprised that the court did not merely sanction him, the 
attorney, instead of severely limiting the testimony the treating physicians so that 
plaintiff could not prove his case. 
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Plaintiffs attorney was surprised at this outcome particularly in light of the 
long-standing policy found in this state and in other states of hearing a matter on 
its merits instead of deciding a case based on a procedural error. 
Plaintiffs attorney was surprised by the court's action due to his previous 
practice in the state of California due to the fact that the plaintiffs case was the 
first personal injury that plaintiffs attorney has tried in the state of Utah, and due 
to the fact that he had previously informed defense counsel of the witnesses he 
intended on calling and due to the fact that defense counsel did not object until it 
filed its motion in limine, which was to be heard only a few days before the trial in 
the matter. 
Plaintiffs attorney was also surprised in light of the fact that the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not give any indication that a result such as the one that 
occurred at this trial was likely to follow failing to meet the disclosure 
requirements found in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
For the above-referenced reasons, the court should reverse the judgment made 
by the trial court and require that a new trial be given to the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
The Lower Court's Ruling Should be Reversed Because Plaintiffs Counsel 
was Surprised by the Result of the Ruling. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states a party or his legal 
representative may be relieved from a final judgment, order or proceeding for 
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various reasons including "surprise." Surprise is only one of the four reasons 
enunciated in Rule 60(b)(1) for relieving a party from a final judgment, order or 
proceeding. ' 1 1 le c 1:1: ler if iree reasons ai e: 1) n listake; 2) inad\ ertence; or, 3) 
excusable neglect. 
The cases in the state of Utah define "excusable neglect" to essentially indicate 
that the neglect is only excusable if the attorney has acted with diligence. See 
Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462 (Utah 2004), see also Lund v. Brown, ± i 
P.3d 277 2000 UT 75 (Utah 2000). The motion in this case was not based on 
"excusable neglect"; it was based on "surprise." 
There have not been, however, any reported cases regarding the "sum; / 
element of the rule. Plaintiff/Appellant's counsel, has reviewed each of the 38 
cases in the state of Utah dealing with a Rule 60(b) motion, and has not found any 
Based on this, plaintiff/appellant asserts that his counsel was reasonably 
surprised by the outcome of the ruling. Plaintiff further asserts that any time a 
from a final judgment, order or proceeding. 
This court, and the Utah Supreme Court, has repeatedly said that "judgment by 
default" is an extreme measure and a case should, where ever possible, be decided 
on the merits." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 P.3d 81, 2006 UT 81, ^ 63 (Utah 2006). 
This matter was not heard on the merits due to the fact that the court limited what 
plaintiffs witnesses could and could not say and the court limited the number of 
before and after witnesses that could testify. The reasons that plaintiff and his 
counsel were reasonably surprised in this matter are as follows: 
1) Court's prefer to have matters decided on their merits instead of on the basis 
of some procedural rule. See Id The ruling of the court in this matter precluded 
plaintiff from having a fair trial due to the fact that his witnesses could not testify 
as needed to prove the case. Plaintiff needed to have witnesses that would be able 
to testify as to causation and as to prognosis. Not surprisingly, because plaintiffs 
witnesses could not testify concerning the cause of the injuries, the jury found a 
verdict of "No Cause." 
2) Plaintiff was surprised because the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
impose the penalty levied by the trial court in this matter. This was plaintiffs 
counsel's first trial in the state of Utah on a personal injury matter. Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does indicate that plaintiff is to disclose witnesses 
30 days before trial. However, nothing in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
anywhere, suggests that the court will limit a parties' witnesses from testifying in 
the event that the disclosures are not complied with. 
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In this case, plaintiffs counsel failed to disclose, in writing, to defense 
counsel the witnesses that he intended on calling at trial. Plaintiffs counsel 
informed defense counsel <:; ihe witnesses orally, bi it did not inform defense 
counsel in \ iTilinj* of the witnesses llint he inli Tiiit xl < n * "iilling. 
About three months prior to trial, at the final pre-trial conference, plaintiffs 
counsel informed defense counsel of the witnesses he intended to call; however, 
possible moment to file a motion in limine objecting to the witnesses he knew 
plaintiff was going to call. Plaintiffs counsel was surprised by the court's ruling 
limiting the testimony and excluding one of the witnesses, as indicated. 
Plaintiffs counsel was surprised by the fact that the only time he had any 
indication that his witnesses were going to be excluded was a couple of days 
before trial. Defense counsel did not file any motions to compel or any other 
counsel sent no letters to plaintiffs counsel and did not give him any notice 
whatsoever of his plans in this regard. 
• • . . e 
fact that a draconian result essentially robbing them of any chance of real victory 
in the case would be levied as a result of the failure. 
4) Plaintiffs counsel was further surprised at the outcome of the motion in 
limine given the fact that Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
indicate any sanctions for violating its terms whereas Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure does provide such warnings. 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an example of what 
plaintiff and plaintiffs counsel thought might occur in the event that they did not 
comply with the discovery or disclosure requirements found in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is to 
file a motion in the event that discovery requests are not honored. The motion is 
to be preceded by a good faith basis of an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute 
before the motion is filed. In the event the motion is filed and the court grants the 
order, and there is further noncompliance, then the court can issue various 
sanctions including striking the pleadings or dismissing the case in the event that 
the orders are not followed. 
No such sanctions are described by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which describes the disclosure requirements. The only indication of 
such a result is found in Rule 26(a)(4)(C) where it indicates that: 
"Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days 
before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified 
by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objection, 
together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility of 
materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, 
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other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good 
cause shown." 
Nevertheless, because the rule does not fully set forth the sanctions that coula 
' i,i is n iVMilH I iliNi p'.ii'ti " iMio'MMpliiirH t; iml I'liilc * 7 I ihr I H ill Rules o f 
Civil Procedure does set out such sanctions, plaintiffs counsel was surprised by 
the outcome of the motion in limine and the court should have allowed plaintiff to 
correct its ei i ;:)i ' . • ' • 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse the decision of the district 
court which ordered the complaint dismissed by issuing a ' \.; ^ aw^r Judgment. 
plaintiff a new trial and allow this matter to be tried on the merits with full benefit 
of the causation and prognosis testimony of plaintiff s treating physicians. 
D : \ I ED:* !,, u < I: i 1 1 2 : - : ; The Law Offiee^ef N ,; t;1 hi r .T -I thn line 
Nathan N. Jardine/7 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 3 . 
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ADDENDUM 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
BRUCE C. BURT, USB No. 8453 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
Facsimile: (801) 364-3756 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY RUKAVINA,, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THOMAS SPRAGUE, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN 
) LIMINE 
) Civil No. 030919128 
) Judge William W. Barrett 
Defendant, Thomas Sprague, moves the court for an order consistent with this motion and 
the attached memorandum in support which is incorporated herein by reference. Specifically, 
Defendant requests the following: (1) exclusion of all references to insurance or insurance coverage 
at trial, (2) exclusion of the traffic accident report, (3) PIP payments should be offset against an 
award of special damages, if any. (4) exclusion of all references to traffic citations issued to 
Defendant, (5) exclusion of all documents not produced or obtained during discovery, (6) exclusion 
of all witnesses not identified during discovery, (7) limiting Dr. Wyman's trial testimony to the 
" < * ; 
/.<:-\., 
- ' i >. 
'"i-^cJ 
content of his one report dated 8/20/2001, (8) exclusion of expert testimony from witnesses not 
identified during discovery, and (9) exclusion of Plaintiffs lost wage claim. 
The bases for these requests are set forth in the accompanying memorandum in support. 
DATED this j T day of November, 2005. 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE, 
urt 
rneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this £_ day of November, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE was HAND DELIVERED, to the following: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mr. Nathan Jardine 
39 Exchange Place, Ste. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
BRUCE C. BURT, USB No. 8453 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
Facsimile: (801) 364-3756 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY RUKAVINA,, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THOMAS SPRAGUE, ] 
Defendant. 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN 
) LIMINE 
) Civil No. 030919128 
) Judge William W. Barrett 
Defendant submits the following Memorandum in support of Motion in Limine: 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANY REFERENCE TO INSURANCE OR INSURANCE COVERAGE SHOULD BE 
EXCLUDED 
Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provides that evidence that a person was 
or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue of whether he acted negligently 
or otherwise wrongfully. As was made clear in the 1965 Utah case of Robinson v. Henson. 17 Utah 
2d, 409 P.2d 121, the question of insurance is immaterial and should not be injected into the trial, 
and it is the duty of both counsel and the Court to guard against it. 
In addition, Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, allows for evidence to be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues 
or misleading the jury. Evidence that Defendant had liability insurance would subject the Defendant 
to the danger of unfair prejudice and/or confusion of the issues and could mislead the jury. 
Any reference to the existence of liability insurance in this case should, therefore, be 
excluded because it is inadmissible on the issue of negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the 
Defendant, because it is immaterial and because it presents the danger of unfair prejudice and/or 
confusion of the issues, and is misleading to the jury. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD EXCLUDE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT 
Defendant moves the Court for a pretrial order excluding the police report as an exhibit at 
trial. The police report is hearsay and should be excluded. Fuither, Rule 803(8) provides that 
police reports are not exceptions to the hearsay rule. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-40 (4)(a) specifically 
excludes police reports as exhibits at trial. As a result, the police report is not admissible per the 
statute and is hearsay. 
in. ANY SPECIAL DAMAGE AWARD MUST BE OFFSET BY PIP 
Defendant requests a pretrial order that any award of special damages be offset by any 
amounts of PIP (personal injury protection) benefits already paid; otherwise, Plaintiff will have a 
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double recovery which is contrary to statute and case law. Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
309(6)(a), the "insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable . . . " This request 
is based on the principle that a recipient of no-fault insurance coverage is precluded from double 
recovery. See Dupuis v. Nelson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981V 
Defendant requests an order granting this request; however, defendant requests that if 
Plaintiff is inclined to present all of his special damage evidence at trial, then the offset be made after 
the verdict is rendered. This seems to be the common practice and Defendant has no objection to 
handling the PIP offset in this manner. This, of course, assumes there is an award of special 
damages. 
IV. ANY REFERENCE TO ANY TRAFFIC CITATIONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED 
Reference to any citation(s) issued to Defendant should be excluded. This evidence is not 
relevant to the issues in this case and is not admissible under the Rules of Evidence. This request 
includes not only the citation issued to Defendant for this collision, but to any other citations prior 
to or subsequent to this collision. 
V. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM OFFERING DOCUMENTS NOT 
PRODUCED OR OBTAINED DURING DISCOVERY 
Upon review of Defendant's file, Plaintiff never produced or filed Initial Disclosures. The 
Initial Disclosure rule requires that a party identify all witnesses that may have discoverable 
information, identify all documents that may support a claim or defense, provide a calculation of 
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damages, and identify all insurance coverage. Plaintiff never provided this pleading to Defendant. 
Further, Plaintiff never responded to Defendant's First Request for Production of Documents 
to Plaintiff. Those requests were mailed to Plaintiffs counsel on May 11, 2004. Thus, since the 
commencement of this lawsuit, defense counsel is not aware of any documents Plaintiff produced 
supporting his claims or defenses. To be fair, Plaintiffs counsel may have provided limited 
documents to Defendant's insurance carrier prior to litigation. Defendant has no objection to 
Plaintiff proffering documents provided to the insurance company. Defendant has no objection to 
Plaintiff proffering documents obtained by subpoena duces tecum either. However, Defendant 
requests that the documents proffered at trial by Plaintiffs counsel be limited to (1) either the 
documents provided to the insurance company pre-litigation, or (2) to documents obtained in a 
subpoena duces tecum. 
Plaintiff should not be allowed to surprise Defendant at trial with documents, medical 
records, reports, bills, etc. that were not produced during discovery. Written discovery requests went 
unanswered. Plaintiff did not provide Initial Disclosures. Further, defendant's expert has only 
examined the available documents either obtained by subpoena or to the insurance company pre-
litigation. Defendant would be substantially prejudiced if Plaintiff were allowed to introduce 
additional documents at trial. 
While Plaintiff did not respond to the requests for production of documents, he did answer 
interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 14 reads: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify by date, title, subject matter and 
present custodian each document plaintiff intends to introduce into evidence at the 
trial in this matter. In lieu of providing this information, plaintiff may attach to his 
Answers to these Interrogatories all such documents. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Plaintiff does not know all documents 
he intends on using at trial at this point. 
Additionally, Defendant requests that the Court limit the proffer of medical bills to those bills 
already produced. Defendant requests that Plaintiff be precluded from attempting to proffer any 
other bills or damage documents at trial. Defendant propounded the following request for production 
of document: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Eveiy medical bill or statement evidencing the medical 
expenses allegedly incurred by plaintiff as a result of the subject accident. 
Plaintiff was given a specific request to produce all bills that support a medical special damage 
claim, but this request went unanswered. The Court should limit the medical special damages to 
those bills already produced. 
VI. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM CALLING ANY WITNESSES NOT 
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED 
Plaintiff has only identified one trial witness. Plaintiff was asked this question in 
interrogatories, but he did not identify any witnesses with the exception of Dr. Rothfeder. The 
relevant interrogatories are set forth below. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: State the name, address and telephone number 
of every witness plaintiff intends to call to testify on plaintiffs behalf at the trial in 
this matter. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 12: Plaintiff does not yet know all witnesses 
he intends on calling. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify each person plaintiff intends to call as 
an expert witness at trial. With respect to each such person, state their current 
address and telephone number, the subject matter on which each is expected to 
testify, and the substance of the facts and opinions on which the expert is to testify. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 15: Plaintiff intends on calling Dr. 
Rothfeder1 as an expert witness in this matter, intends [sic] on calling other experts 
which he has not yet identified. 
No supplements to these answers were produced. Defendant believes that the identification of Dr. 
Rothfeder may have been a typographical error and that Plaintiff may have meant Dr. Dennis 
Wyman, Dr. Rothfeder's partner. Dr. Rothfeder did not treat Mr. Rukavina and Plaintiff has 
produced no reports from Dr. Rothfeder; on the other hand, Defendant does have one report from 
Dr. Dennis J. Wyman. 
Thus, the only witness Plaintiff has identified is Dr. Wyman. Defendant assumes that 
Plaintiff will testify at trial, but Defendant requests an order limiting the trial witnesses to Plaintiff 
and Dr. Wyman. If Plaintiff intended to call other trial witnesses, they should have been identified 
during discovery. 
VII. THE COURT SHOULD LIMIT DR. WYMAN'S TRIAL TESTIMONY TO THE 
CONTENT OF HIS ONE MEDICAL RECORD DATED 8/20/2001 
The only record Defendant has of Dr. Wyman is dated 8/20/2001 and is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. Plaintiff has not produced any other reports from Dr. Wyman, nor has he produced any 
Defendant believes this may have been a typographical error. Defendant has no knowledge that Dr. Rothfeder treated 
or saw Mr. Rukavina. However, Defendant has one medical record from Dr. Rothfeder's partner, Dennis J. Wyman. M.D. If this 
is a typographical error, it was a good faith error and Defendant has no objection to the testimony of Dr. Wyman (consistent with 
his report) at trial if that is what Plaintiff intended when answering Interrogatory No. 15. 
Page 6 of 10 
expert reports from other experts. Defendant asks this court to limit the testimony of Dr. Wyman 
to the opinions expressed in the attached report. Certainly, if Plaintiff intended Dr. Wyman to offer 
expert testimony beyond that which is contained in Exhibit A, he was required to serve some 
advance notice to Defendant of that intent. Because Plaintiff has not supplemented his answers to 
interrogatories and did not respond to the request for production of documents, there is no way for 
Defendant to know whether Dr. Wyman intends to offer other opinions at trial. Defendant has no 
objection to the testimony of Dr. Wyman so long as that testimony does not extend beyond the scope 
of the 8/20/2001 record/report. If Plaintiff intends to have Dr. Wyman go beyond the scope of this 
document and offer other opinions, Defendant objects and seeks an order limiting Dr. Wyman at 
trial. 
VIII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO OFFER EXPERT TESTIMONY 
OTHER THAN FROM DR. DENNIS J. WYMAN 
Plaintiff identified only one expert witness in answers to interrogatories. Plaintiff has not 
given Defendant advance notice that he intends to call any other experts at trial. He has not provided 
any expert reports or curriculum vitae of other experts. Accordingly, Defendant asks for an order 
precluding Plaintiff from offering expert testimony from any other witness at trial. This request is 
consistent with the request made in point VI above in which Defendant sought to limit the trial 
witnesses to those already identified by Plaintiff (i.e Plaintiff and Dr. Wyman). 
Trial is set for December 6 - 8, 2005. Discovery is complete. Plaintiff did not object to the 
trial date. Certainly, if Plaintiff intended to offer expert testimony other than that of Dr. Wyman, then 
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Plaintiff was required to provide Defendant some advance notice of that testimony with sufficient 
time for Defendant to depose those witnesses and to have Defendant's expert review those opinions 
or reports. 
In sum, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be precluded from offering expert testimony from 
any other witnesses at trial. Defendant will suffer significant prejudice if Plaintiff is allowed to call 
other expert witnesses at trial. Plaintiff has had sufficient time in which to develop his case and if 
he intended to call other expert witnesses, he was required to identify those witnesses. 
DC PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM ALLEGING A LOST WAGE CLAIM 
In his deposition, Plaintiff suggested that he may have lost wages associated with this 
accident. However, he did not calculate that claim, nor has he produced any supporting documents 
or evidence despite a formal document production request. The lost wage claim should be 
precluded. 
Defendant propounded the following interrogatory 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please state whether plaintiff lost any income 
as a result of the accident specified in plaintiffs Complaint. If so, please stated: 
(a) the dates during which plaintiff was absent from work as a result of the injuries 
alleged in plaintiffs Complaint; 
(b) the reasons why plaintiff was unable to work on said dates; 
(c) the total loss of income due to plaintiffs absence from work as a result of said 
injuries, and how said amount was calculated; and, 
(d) the total anticipated loss of future income, if any, and how said amount was 
calculated. 
Response to Interrogatory No. 10: Plaintiff has not yet calculated his lost 
income as a result of this incident. 
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Plaintiff never calculated a lost wage claim. Plaintiff has not produced any documents to support 
a wage claim even though they were requested. Defendant requested the following: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Eveiy medical bill or statement evidencing the medical 
expenses allegedly incurred by plaintiff as a result of the subject accident. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Every document evidencing plaintiffs damages, including 
any lost income. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Every document identified or referred to in plaintiffs 
Answers to Interrogatories. 
*** 
REQUEST NO. 6: All federal and state income tax returns, including Form 
W-2fs or Form 1099's, filed by plaintiff, either individually or jointly, for calendar 
years 1993 through 2003. 
Plaintiff did not respond to these discovery requests. Tax returns were even requested in Plaintiffs 
deposition, but there were never given to defense counsel. Based on the complete failure to respond 
to relevant discovery requests, Defendant requests that the lost wage claim be precluded at trial. 
In conclusion, Defendant requests an order prior to trial consistent with this motion. 
DATED this Q_ day of November, 2005. 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this $1 day of /fW^bs^ 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE was 
HAND DELIVERED, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mr. Nathan Jardine 
39 Exchange Place, Ste. 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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V o . 
Thomas Sprague 
Motion of Plaintiff to be Relieved 
of the Court's Suppression Order 
and to Allow Plaintiff to Supplement 
his Interrogatory Responses and Other 
Discovery Responses 
Case No. 030919128 
Judge William W. Barrett 
Defendant. 
Introduction 
Plaintiff, Andy Rukavina, by and through his attorney of record, hereby moves this court for an order 
allowing him to be relieved of the court's Suppression Order which was entered on December 2, 2005. 
The ruling came as a surprise to Plaintiffs counsel impart based on the fact of the first five years of 
his practice took place in the State of California and the practice of law is significantly different there than 
it is in the State of Utah. Furthennore, all of the personal injury cases handled by the Plaintiffs counsel in 
this state has settled, and no particular case has got to this stage. The surprise of Plaintiff s Counsel caused 
him to neglect filing a response to Defendant's Motion in Limine. Said neglect was "excusable neglect" 
t i n . * 
, . if.- i ' 
LiO 
under the statute. 
Furthermore, the court's ruling on the Motion in Limine was a surprise to Plaintiffs counsel do to the 
fact that, in order to make the ruling, the court inadvertently ignored a significant portion of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The grounds of this motion are Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is based on the 
memorandum in support of the motion together with any documents in the courts file and any evidence that 
may be introduced at the hearing in this matter. 
Dated: December 7, 2005 
Respectfully Submiked. 
Him, 
Nathan N. Jardine / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on December 7,2005, a true and correct copy of the forgoing 
document was served by hand delivery or United States First Class Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following: 
Bruce C. Burt 
Nelson, Chipman, Quigley & Hansen 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Heather M Barber 
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Thomas Sprague 
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Memorandum In Support of Motion 
of Plaintiff to be Relieved of the Court's 
Suppression Order and to Allow Plaintiff 
to Supplement His Discovery Responses 
Case No. 030919128 
Judge William W. Barrett 
Introduction 
Plaintiffs counsel, Nathan N. Jardine, practiced law in the State of California for five years prior to 
coming to the State of Utah. While in California, Mr. Jardine tried approximately a dozen personal injury 
cases. During that experience, Motions in Limine were generally filed on the day of trial and heard on that 
day. Although the rules of Civil Procedure are similar in the State of California as in the State of Utah, the 
practice of law in the State of Utah is far different from the practice in the State of California. The above 
referenced example is only one example of the differences. 
On December 2,2005 at the 8:30 hearing that morning the court in this matter made a ruling granting 
/a^ 
the Defense Counsel's Suppression Motion. 
Plaintiffs Counsel was surprised when, at the Suppression Motion hearing, Defense Counsel's 
asserted that he had not responded to the Motion in Limine. The reason for that surprise was the fact that 
it was the previous experience of the Plaintiffs Counsel as described above. After all, in Plaintiffs 
Counsel's mind Motions in Limine are simply filed to be heard on the day of trial. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs Counsel has informed Defense Counsel on at least one occasion three months 
prior to the trial, after the final pre-trial conference, that he intended on calling most if not all of Plaintiff s 
treating physicians to testify in this matter. He also informed Defense Counsel that he intended on calling 
three or four before or after witnesses. At no time did Defense Counsel inform Plaintiffs Counsel that 
Defense Counsel intended on moving to exclude that testimony based on the fact that they had, not prior to 
that time, been disclosed. 
In fact, Defense Counsel has been aware of the treating physicians of Plaintiff almost since the 
inception of this matter, but clearly since the time when Defense Counsel first came into the case and found 
the demand letter that had been given to Defense Counsel's insurance carrier regarding the matter. 
As Defense Counsel properly has stated, Plaintiffs Counsel has not designated an expert witness in 
this matter. It has been Plaintiffs Counsel's plan all along, to call treating physicians instead of the expert 
witnesses. Despite this Defense Counsel has not taken the opportunity to depose the treating physicians that 
Plaintiff might call. Instead, Defense Counsel has chosen to save his client money by not deposing said 
witnesses. 
Certainly that is Defense Counsel's choice, but Plaintiffs Counsel should not have to bear the burden 
of that choice. Clearly, in order to prove his case, Plaintiffs Counsel is going have to call a medical witness. 
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He has not designated an expert witness. For that reason, he was only left with calling Plaintiffs treating 
physicians. Now, Defense Counsel has succeeded in limiting the testimony of those treating physicians. 
Furthermore, Defense Counsel complains that Plaintiff has not supplemented his interrogatories 
responses and did not properly answer the previous interrogatories propounded on Plaintiff. Due to Defense 
Counsel's complaining, the court in this matter ordered that Plaintiff is limited in the method in which he 
is able to elicit a testimony from the treating physicians. 
Plaintiff was surprised by this ruling especially in light of the fact the Defense Counsel has never filed 
a Motion to Compel in this matter. In fact, Defense Counsel is not compliant with Rule 37 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure in any fashion. Under a said section, Defense Counsel, in the event of discovery problems, 
has an obligation to file a Motion to Compel. Prior to filing that Motion to Compel, Defense Counsel must 
in good faith contact Plaintiffs Counsel to try to resolve their discovery dispute. After trying to resolve their 
discovery dispute, if they cannot resolve a discovery dispute, Defense Counsel may then file a Motion to 
Compel. The court has the option at that point to order Plaintiff to comply with the discovery process. If 
Plaintiff does not comply with the discovery process, at that point, the court has the discretion to levy 
various sanctions including the type of sanctions that were levied in the Motion to Suppress hearing which 
occurred on December 2, 2005 at 8:30 a.m. 
In other words, the court skipped all of the steps required by Rule 37 and went to the ultimate 
sanction of limiting the testimony that was to be elicited. And this, because Defense Counsel has repeatedly 
said that Plaintiff did not properly answer his interrogatories and did not supplement his interrogatory 
responses. Clearly, theses sanctions should not issue unless the procedures found in Rule 37 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure had been followed. The fact that such sanctions were levied is a reasonable basis 
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for providing surprise to Plaintiff and his Counsel. 
Law and Argument. 
Under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgement, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
. ." In the case at bar, there seems to be ample support that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs Counsel were in fact 
reasonably surprised by the proceedings which occurred in the above referenced matter. They were surprised 
not only because of the rulings of the court in light of the court's failure to follow the Rule 37 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but because of Mr. Jardine's previous practice in the State of California regarding 
personal injury matters. 
Plaintiffs cause in this matter is just and it is just that the court relieve Plaintiff of the effects of its 
ruling. The fact of the matter is that Plaintiffs car sustained significant damage, through no fault of his own, 
when Defendant's car plowed into the side of his car. Contrary to Defense Counsel's assertions, the accident 
was as major accident and caused thousands of dollars of damage to Plaintiffs vehicle. 
Defendant was on a busy street at the time that he was trying to make an illegal u-turn. He knifed 
his vehicle to make the illegal u-turn right into the side of Plaintiff s car as Plaintiff was driving in a legal 
and lawful manner in the lane beside defendant. 
Because of Defendant's actions in this matter, Plaintiff has suffered significant injuries and damage. 
Prior to this accident, Plaintiff was recovering from various injuries that he had sustained in previous 
accidents. He was nearly recovered from his accidents. His health was in a delicate stage due to the fact 
that he had previous accidents; however, Plaintiff was riding a stationary bike and walking in the pool. 
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Plaintiff cannot do either of those activities now. 
As a result of this accident, Plaintiff sustained herniated discs to his back and aggravated previous 
injuries. Plaintiffs ankle was re-injured. The bone that had been graphed onto his ankle was torn loose. 
He had now had doctors inform him that they can do nothing for his ankle. All of these injuries have been 
sustained because Defendant was careless in the way that Defendant drove. 
Now Plaintiff comes to this court trying to receive recompense for his damages. He had received 
offers from the opposing side which he does not believe will compensate him for his injuries, and, so he is 
asking the court for a jury trial so that he may be compensated. 
Justice requires that Plaintiff be allowed to at least have an opportunity of proving his case in this 
matter. He should at least have an opportunity to prove that his treating physicians are of the opinion that 
the accident which occurred on June 29,2001 is the cause of his injuries and that he will sustain continued 
injury and damage as a result of it. His doctors should be allowed to tell the jury the prognosis they have 
given him. 
Furthermore, even though Plaintiff does not have any documentation to support his wage loss claim, 
he should at least be able to testify that his wage losses were $30,000 per year. 
The fact that Plaintiff and his counsel were surprised by the court's rulings and by the proceedings 
and the practice which has occurred in this court, are reasonable basis to grant this motion under Rule 60 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Fairness and justice dictate that Plaintiff be allowed his day in court. 
Certainly, Defense Counsel can take the depositions of the witnesses Plaintiff would like to call. 
Furthermore, the defense has had an opportunity to take Mr. Rukavina's deposition, and if they would like 
to take another they may so that Mr. Rukavina can speak about his wage loss and loss of earning capacity. 
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Justice requires that Mr. Rukavina allowed to have his day in court. Plaintiff should be allowed to 
call the witnesses which he has designated, Dr. Winterton, Dr. Wyman, and Dr. Hawkins. Those witnesses 
should be allowed to testify concerning Mr. Rukavina's injuries, the causes of those injuries, Mr. Rukavina's 
prognosis, and his cost of treatment. Plaintiff should also be allowed to call Ron Yengich and his other 
designated before and after witnesses. Certainly if the testimony becomes cumulative the court can curtail 
the testimony at that time. 
For the foregoing reasons, and because the right thing to do in this matter is to give Mr. Rukavina 
his day in court, Mr. Rukavina should be relieved of the effects of the suppression ruling. 
Dated: December 7, 2005 
Respectfully Submitted. 
Nathan N. Jardine 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on December 7, 2005, a true and correct copy of the Motion 
to Continue Scheduling Conference was served by hand delivery or United States First Class Mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Bruce C. Burt, Esq. 
Nelson, Chipman, Quigley & Hansen 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Heather M Barber 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BE RELIEVED 
OF THE COURT'S SUPPRESSION ORDER 
AND TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO 
SUPPLEMENT HIS DISCOVERY RESPONSES 
BRUCE C. BURT, USB No. 8453 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE 
215 South State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
Facsimile: (801) 364-3756 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY RUKAVINA,, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
THOMAS SPRAGUE, ] 
Defendant. ] 
1 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
> TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BE 
> RELIEVED OF THE COURT'S 
> SUPPRESSION ORDER AND TO 
) ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO 
) SUPPLEMENT HIS DISCOVERY 
) RESPONSES 
) Civil No. 030919128 
) Judge William W. Barrett 
Defendant submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to be 
Relieved of the Court's Suppression Order and to Allow Plaintiff to Supplement his Discovery 
Responses (hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition) as follows: 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff did not file Initial Disclosures. 
v 
2. Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but did not supplement them. 
3. In Plaintiffs answers to interrogatories, he identified only one trial witness, Dr. 
Robert Rothfeder. 
4. Plaintiff did not file a designation of expert witnesses, nor did he provide any expert 
reports. 
5. Plaintiff did not file Pre-Trial Disclosures. 
6. Plaintiff did not produce any documents during the course of discovery; rather, he 
produced limited documents prior to litigation to Defendant's insurance carrier. 
7. The only documents that were produced in this case were produced by defendant and 
his attorney. 
8. Plaintiff did not produce any documents to support a lost wage claim, despite the fact 
that they were asked for in a request for production of documents and in his deposition. 
9. Plaintiff wholly failed to respond to defendant's request for production of documents. 
10. Plaintiff did not oppose, in writing, Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
11. Despite not filing a written opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine, the Court 
heard oral argument on the motion on December 2, 2005. 
12. Plaintiffs counsel was present and presented his objections to the motion in limine. 
13. On that same date, Plaintiffs counsel produced his designation of trial witnesses 
which included four "before and after" witnesses (one of whom was prominent criminal defense 
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attorney and cousin of Plaintiff, Mr. Ron Yengich), Dr. Dennis Wyman, Dr. Paul Winterton, and 
Eugene Hawkins, D.C. 
ARGUMENT 
L PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) 
It appears to be Plaintiff s position that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)( 1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule reads in relevant part: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relive a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
Plaintiff argues "surprise." He states: 
In the case at bar, there seems to be ample support that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs 
counsel were in fact reasonably surprised by the proceedings which occurred in the 
above referenced matter. They were surprised not only because of the rulings of the 
court in light of the court's failure to follow the Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but because of Mr. Jardine's previous practice in the State of California 
regarding personal injury matters. (Memo, in Supp. at 4). 
A. Plaintiff has not Shown "Surprise" 
It appears to be Plaintiffs position that because motions in limine in California are heard on 
the day of trial, that somehow he was "surprised" and that the order should be set aside. This 
argument lacks merit. First, the cited California practice in California was followed in this case. 
The Court, just days before the trial, allowed Plaintiff to orally object to the motion on December 
2, 2005. Thus, reliance on the California practice/procedure is misguided. Further, the Court's 
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ruling on Defendant's Motion in Limine was not based entirely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file 
a written objection. While that may have been one consideration, the basis of the Court's ruling was 
multi factorial, including Plaintiffs complete failure to respond to requests for production of 
documents, for failure to supplement interrogatory answers, for failure to file required pre-trial 
disclosures, for failure to file expert witness designations, etc. 
Plaintiffs attorney cannot reasonably argue "surprise" based on this alleged California 
practice. Plaintiffs attorney has been licensed to practice law in the State of Utah since 1998 
(Exhibit 1, attached). By filing a civil lawsuit, he is charged with knowledge of the applicable rules 
of procedure, in this case the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Those rules are clear. He cannot 
reasonably argue "surprise" when the Court chooses to enforce those rules. Plaintiffs attorney 
should have actual knowledge of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure if he is practices civil law in the 
State of Utah. Ignorance of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure cannot reasonably be a valid defense 
of "surprise" under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Plaintiffs attorney ignored nearly every disclosure requirement in Rule 26. For instance, 
Rule 26(a)(1) requires each party to file Initial Disclosures. Plaintiffs attorney knows or should 
know that this rule requires him to identify all witnesses with discoverable information. The Court's 
order excluded one of Plaintiffs "before and after" witnesses, Mr. Ron Yengich. However, if 
Plaintiff intended to call him as a witness at trial, he should have identified him in his Initial 
Disclosures. He had a second opportunity to identify him in answers to interrogatories, but he did 
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not identify him at that time either. In point of fact, Plaintiffs attorney first presented defense 
counsel with a designation of witnesses on December 2,2005 - four (4) days before the trial. The 
Court properly excluded Mr. Yengich at trial. Finally, calling four "before and after" witnesses is 
cumulative and repetitive and this reasoning was part of the court's order. 
Another rule Plaintiff ignored was Rule 26(a)(4), Pretrial Disclosures. This rule explicitly 
enumerates the type of information required to be disclosed prior to trial and when it is to be 
disclosed. The rule requires that 30 days before trial, each party designate all witnesses that will be 
called to testify. See Rule 26(a¥4YA). Opposing Counsel is then given 14 days to object to the 
witness designation. However, Plaintiff did not file Pre-Trial Disclosures. Thus, Defendant had no 
knowledge of the existence of Mr. Yengich (or the other "before and after" witnesses) or Dr. 
Winterton, or Dr. Hawkins until four (4) days before the trial was set to begin. Plaintiff cannot 
reasonably argue "surprise" given his failure to follow this rule. Plaintiff had an obligation to 
disclose all trial witnesses 30 days before trial and he failed to do that here. 
Another rule Plaintiff ignored was Rule 26(e), Supplementation of responses. In this case, 
Plaintiff answered interrogatories, but the only trial witness identified was Dr. Robert Rothfeder. 
Rule 26(e)(2) unambiguously requires a party to supplement disclosures and answers to 
interrogatories "seasonably." No supplements were produced by Plaintiff. Thus, when the Court 
excluded Mr. Yengich, limited the number of "before and after" witnesses, and limited the scope of 
the medical witnesses, it was justified. Plaintiff had an obligation to supplement his interrogatories 
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and inform defense counsel of the identify of the witnesses and the substance of their testimony well 
before trial and he did not do that. 
B. A Motion to Compel and an Order Compelling Discovery was not Required, nor is it a Basis 
for "Surprise" under Rule 60(b) 
Plaintiff argues that the Court did not follow the procedure outlined in Rule 37(a) (i.e. a 
motion to compel and an order to compel discovery) and that somehow he was "surprised" that the 
Court excluded and limited evidence. In other words, because Defendant did not first file a motion 
to compel Plaintiff to file Initial Disclosures, to answer requests for production of documents, to 
supplement interrogatory answers, to file Pre-Trial disclosures, and to file designation of expert 
witnesses, that Plaintiff was "reasonably surprised" when the Court excluded and limited evidence. 
This argument impermissibly shifts the burden of production to the Defendant. It also ignores Rule 
37(d) and Utah Case law.1 Plaintiff has an affirmative duty under Rules 26(a) and (e) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to provide these disclosures. Defendant had no affirmative duty to present a 
Motion to Compel required disclosures. Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue "surprise" because a 
motion to compel discovery was not filed before the evidence was excluded. 
C. Limiting the Medical Witnesses9 Trial Testimony was not "Surprise" 
Plaintiff also argues that the Court's order limiting the scope of the medical witness 
1
 See e.g. Coxev v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles. 112 P.3d 1244 (UtahApp 2005)(Rule 37(d) "allows a court to 
impose sanctions against a party for disregarding discovery obligations even when that party has not violated a court order 
specifically compelling discovery." (Citing Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585); See also W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner. Inc. v. Park W. Vill. Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 n.9 ("No court order is required to bring [r]ule 37(d) into play. It is 
enough that a notice of the taking of a deposition or a set of interrogatories or a request for inspection has been properly served 
on the party." (Cite omitted)). 
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testimony at trial was "surprise." Plaintiff argues that Defense counsel knew who the treating 
physicians were, that he was told at a pretrial conference that "treating physicians" would be called 
to testify. There are many problems with this argument. First, the Court has allowed Dr. Winterton 
and Dr. Hawkins to testify despite the fact that they were not disclosed prior to December 2, 2005. 
Clearly, the Court could have excluded them entirely. Defense counsel told the Court that he had 
no objection to these physicians testifying at trial so long as they were limited to the content of their 
medical records. This way, there would be no surprises for Defendant and his expert. Thus, based 
on this concession, the Court simply limited the scope of their testimony to the information stated 
in their medical records. Certainly, it would not have been unreasonable for the Court to entirely 
exclude them from testifying given the fact that they were not identified earlier and given that 
Plaintiff still has not identified the scope, nature and extent of their testimony. 
Second, while it is true that Defense counsel knew that medical doctors treated this plaintiff, 
that is not the same thing as knowing which doctors will testify at trial. The fact is, defense counsel 
did not know who would be called to testify at trial until days before it was set to begin. Plaintiff 
did not designate any physicians as trial witnesses, and based on that non-disclosure Defendant took 
no depositions. Interrogatories were sent to Plaintiff during fact discovery for the express purpose 
of determining which witnesses would be called at trial.. Plaintiff identified only one medical 
doctor, Dr. Robert Rothfeder. Defendant reasonably relied on Plaintiffs answers to interrogatories. 
If Plaintiff intended to call other witnesses, he had an affirmative duty to disclose them in a timely 
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fashion. He did not timely disclose trial witnesses and it was proper for the Court to limit the scope 
of their testimony. 
Third, under Rule 26(a)(3), Disclosure of expert testimony, Plaintiff was required to put 
Defendant on advance notice of the expected testimony of all witnesses that would be offering expert 
opinions. Plaintiff did not file a designation of expert witnesses. Plaintiff did not produce any 
expert reports. Plaintiff did not identify any experts in his answers to interrogatories with the 
exception of Dr. Rothfeder. Again, Defendant reasonably relied on this non-disclosure and took no 
depositions of treating physicians. The Court has allowed Plaintiff to call Dr. Wyman, Dr. 
Winterton, and Dr. Hawkins, but it limited the scope of their testimony to the comments in their 
medical records. This way, Defendant has no surprises at trial. It would be fundamentally unfair 
and prejudicial to allow Plaintiff to completely ignore the disclosure requirements of Rule 26 and 
then call three medical witnesses at trial to offer opinions not previously disclosed. Thus, when the 
Court limited the scope of the medical witnesses at trial to the content of their records, it was to 
prevent an injustice to the Defendant. The disclosure requirements in Rule 26 are clear and 
Plaintiff s attorney knew or should have known that he was required to adhere to them; thus, it is not 
a "surprise" when the Court limits the medical testimony based on non-disclosure. 
Plaintiff has pleaded for the Court's mercy to allow him to present his case to the jury 
arguing that he has suffered significant injuries as a result of this accident, etc. (Memo, in Supp. at 
1-2). If Plaintiff suffered from a significant accident related injury, the physician(s) that would 
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offer the causal connection should have been identified during discovery. It is prejudicial and 
fundamentally unfair to keep the Defendant completely in the dark about the content and scope of 
an expert witnesses trial testimony. 
Plaintiff argues that defense counsel knew who treated Plaintiff and that we should have 
deposed the treating physicians. (Memo, in Supp. at 2). Plaintiff treated with many different treating 
physicians, but only one of them was identified as a trial witness. Knowing who treated Plaintiff and 
knowing who will testify at trial are distinctly different. Defense counsel made a calculated decision 
not to depose the only identified medical doctor but this decision was based on prior dealings with 
this physician and based on what information is contained in his one record dated 8/20/2001. The 
fact is, Plaintiff wants his treating physicians to offer causation opinions at trial that they did not 
include in written reports. Plaintiff wants his treating physicians to offer expert opinions on subjects 
not found in even an attorney-prepared expert report. The rules of civil procedure are broad enough 
that Mr. Jardine could have prepared an expert report outlining the facts, opinions, and other bases 
for his experts' trial testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The bottom line here is that Plaintiff completely ignored all of the disclosure requirements 
from the beginning of the case. Plaintiff then argued he was "surprised" when the Court limited his 
evidence at trial based on this lack of disclosure. Plaintiff has not shown "surprise" under Rule 60(b) 
and the motion should be denied and the matter should be set for an immediate trial. 
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While Judge Hilder denied Defendant's request for attorney's fees and other sanctions, 
Defendant requests that the Court order Plaintiff to pay Defendant the non-refundable $2,000 trial 
retainer paid to Dr. Chung. This is a cost that must be re-paid when this matter is re-set for trial. 
Thus, instead of paying Dr. Chung $2,000, Defendant will now have to pay him $4,000. That is a 
significant cost that could have been avoided if Plaintiff had adhered to the applicable rules of civil 
procedure. Defendant asks for an order compelling Plaintiff to re-pay Defendant this non-refundable 
$2,000 cost. Defendant further requests attorneys fees and will defer to the discretion of the trial 
court on these issues. This request is supported by Rule 37(f). 
DATED this Jj[_ day of December, 2005. 
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE, 
u^Burt 
Ar' Attdrheys for Defendant 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Philip F. COXEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF THE EAGLES, 
AERIE No. 2742, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20040298-CA. 
April 21, 2005. 
Background: Plaintiff appealed decision of the 
Second District Court, Ogden Department, Pamela 
G. Heffernan, J., dismissing suit as discovery 
sanction for failure to produce videotape. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., 
held that: 
(1) failure to produce videotape because plaintiff's 
attorney determined on his own accord that it was 
inadmissible was willful and demonstrated fault, and 
(2) dismissal was not too harsh. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Pretrial Procedure <@^=>46 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak46 Dismissal or Default Judgment. 
Rule permitting dismissal as discovery sanction did 
not apply to case filed before effective date of the 
rule. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(f). 
[2] Appeal and Error <®==>1061.2 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)14 Dismissal 
30kl061.2 In General. 
Trial court's erroneous reliance on discovery rule 
to dismiss case filed before effective date of rule 
was harmless in light of affirmance on other 
grounds. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(f). 
[3] Appeal and Error <@=^ 852 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k852 Scope and Theory of Case. 
[See headnote text below] 
[3] Appeal and Error <@=>856(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Tneory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining Decision Not 
Considered 
30k856(l) In General. 
An appellate court may affirm a judgment, order, 
or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though that ground or theory was not identified by 
the lower court as the basis of its ruling. 
[4] Pretrial Procedure <©^46 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak46 Dismissal or Default Judgment. 
Trial courts have authority to dismiss an action as a 
sanction for a party's failure to comply in the 
discovery process. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[5] Pretrial Procedure <®^>221 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(C) Discovery Depositions 
307AII(C)6 Failure to Appear or Testify; 
Sanctions 
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307Ak221 In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Pretrial Procedure <@==>309 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(D) Interrogatories to Parties 
307AII(D)4 Failure to Answer; Sanctions 
307Ak309 In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Pretrial Procedure <@=^ 434 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions 
307Ak434 In General. 
A trial court may impose sanctions against a party 
for disregarding discovery obligations regarding 
depositions, interrogatories, or requests for 
inspection, even when that party has not directly 
violated a court order specifically compelling 
discovery; it is enough that a notice of the taking of 
a deposition or a set of interrogatories or a request 
for inspection has been properly served on the party. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(d). 
[6] Pretrial Procedure <@=>44.1 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak44.1 In General. 
Before the court imposes discovery sanctions, it 
must find on the part of the noncomplying party, 
willfulness, bad faith, or fault or persistent dilatory 
tactics frustrating the judicial process. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[7] Pretrial Procedure <@=>44.1 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak44.1 In General. 
Once the trial court finds willfulness, bad faith, 
fault, or dilatory tactics, the choice of an appropriate 
discovery sanction is primarily the responsibility of 
the trial judge. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[8] Pretrial Procedure <@=>44.1 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(A) Discovery in General 
307Ak44 Failure to Disclose; Sanctions 
307Ak44.1 In General. 
Because trial courts must deal first hand with the 
parties and the discovery process, they are given 
broad discretion regarding the imposition of 
discovery sanctions. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[9] Pretrial Procedure <@^434 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions 
307Ak434 In General. 
Plaintiffs failure to produce videotape because his 
attorney determined on his own accord that it was 
inadmissible was "willful" for purposes of discovery 
sanction; although attorney's reasoning was not 
impugned with bad motive, the attorney intentionally 
failed to disclose discoverable evidence. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[10] Pretrial Procedure <@^434 
307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions 
307Ak434 In General. 
Plaintiff's failure to produce videotape because his 
attorney determined on his ,own accord that it was 
inadmissible demonstrated fault for purposes of 
discovery sanction. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37. 
[11] Pretrial Procedure <@^ =>435 
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307A — 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307AII(E) Production of Documents and 
Things and Entry on Land 
307AII(E)6 Failure to Comply; Sanctions 
307Ak435 Dismissal or Default Judgment. 
Prejudicial dismissal was not too harsh as discovery 
sanction for plaintiff's failure to produce videotape 
in response to defendant's request for photographs; 
the gravamen of the complaint was the still 
photographs of the injuries and campground made 
from the videotape and offered into evidence on die 
second day of trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 37(d). 
*1245 James R. Hasenyager and Peter W. 
Summerill, Hasenyager & Summerill, Ogden, for 
Appellant. 
John R. Lund and Julianne Blanch, Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
[1][2][3] K 1 Appellant Philip F. Coxey appeals the 
trial court's Decision and Order of Dismissal With 
Prejudice asserting that the *1246 trial court erred 
by dismissing his case under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure -37 when no discovery order existed. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37. We affirm. (FN1) 
[4] Tf 2 Under rule 37, trial courts have authority to 
dismiss an action as a sanction for a party's failure 
to comply in the discovery process. See id. Rule 
37(d) provides, in relevant part, 
If a party ... fails ... to serve a written response to 
a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34 ... 
the court in which the action is pending on motion 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as 
are just, and among others it may take any action 
authorized under Paragraph^ ] ... (C) of 
Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d). Paragraph (C) of 
subdivision (b)(2) farther provides that the court 
may impose "an order striking out pleadings or parts 
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order 
is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or 
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party." Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(C). 
[5] % 3 In addition, rule 37(d) "allows a court to 
impose sanctions against a party for disregarding 
discovery obligations even when that party has not 
directly violated a court order specifically 
compelling discovery." Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1990); see, e.g., W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park W. Vill. Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 n. 9 
(Utah 1977) (" 'No court order is required to bring 
[r]ule 37(d) into play. It is enough that a notice of 
the taking of a deposition or a set of interrogatories 
or a request for inspection has been properly served 
on the party.' " (citation omitted)). 
[6] f 4 Before the court imposes discovery 
sanctions under rule 37, it "must find on the part of 
the noncomplying party, willfulness, bad faith, or 
fault," Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 
271, 274 (Utah 1997), or "persistent dilatory tactics 
frustrating the judicial process." W.W. & W.B. 
Gardner, 568 P.2d at 738. 
[7][8] 1f 5 Once the trial court finds willfulness, bad 
faith, fault or dilatory tactics, "[t]he choice of an 
appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the 
responsibility of the trial judge." Morton, 938 P.2d 
at 274 (alteration in original) (quotations and 
citations omitted). " 'Because trial courts must deal 
first hand with the parties and the discovery process, 
they are given broad discretion regarding the 
imposition of discovery sanctions.' " Id. (quoting 
UtahDep'tofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892P.2d4, 6 
(Utah 1995)). Broad discretion includes dismissal, 
which is the " 'most severe of the potential 
sanctions.' " Id. (quoting Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d ai 
7). 
[9] [10] 1 6 The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that Appellant's failure to 
disclose was willful. "Willful failure has been 
defined as any intentional failure as distinguished 
from involuntary noncompliance. No wrongful 
intent need be shown." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8 
(quotations and citations omitted). Appellant's first 
attorney failed to produce the videotape because he 
determined on his own accord that it was 
inadmissible. The trial court correctly concluded 
that although his reasoning was not impugned with 
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bad motive, it was willful because he intentionally 
failed to disclose discoverable evidence. (FN2) 
*1247. [11] Tf 7 Appellant further argues that 
dismissal was too harsh a sanction for his failure to 
produce the videotape considering Appellee 
requested photographs, not a videotape. Appellant 
contended that Appellee used the term "videotape" 
in other interrogatories, suggesting that when he 
requested photographs of the injuries and the 
campground he did not want a videotape. It is 
unnecessary for us to determine whether Appellant's 
distinction between the requested photographs and 
the videotape was of merit, given that the gravamen 
of Appellee's complaint was the still photographs of 
the injuries and campground made from the 
videotape, which Appellant sought to introduce on 
the second day of trial. Thus, this argument clearly 
fails. 
t 8 Especially given the prior history of this case, 
we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the case based on 
Appellant's failure to produce the still photographs 
made from the videotape. Therefore, we affirm. 
1 9 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
(FN1.) The trial court erred in relying on rule 37(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in its Decision 
and Order of Dismissal. The trial court based its 
decision to dismiss in part on rule 37(f), which was 
amended with other discovery rules effective 
November 1, 1999. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26 
advisory committee's note. The supreme court 
order approving rule 37(f) prescribed that the "new 
procedures [ (1999 discovery changes) ] be 
applicable only to cases filed on or after November 
1, 1999." Id, The present case was filed October 
16, 1998. Because we uphold the trial court's 
decision on other grounds, the trial court's reliance 
on rule 37(f) is harmless error. "[A]n appellate 
court may affirm a 'judgment, order, or decree 
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record,' even 
though that ground or theory was not identified by 
the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 
2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969)). 
(FN2.) The trial court also correctly determined 
that the Appellant's failure to produce the videotape 
demonstrates fault. Specifically, the court noted 
that "fault can be assessed because even though a 
piece of evidence is ultimately deemed not 
admissible in court during trial or some other 
proceeding that does not make it non discoverable. 
That was an error in judgment and can be deemed 
faulty." 
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